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Market  power  affects  the  distribution  of  quota  rents  in the  market
for Mexico's exports  of apparel  and  textiles  to the United  States
under  the  Multi-Fibre  Arrangement.  Although  rents  from  quotas
on apparel  are  probably  small  in the case  of Mexico,  a significant
share goes to U.S. importers  for such product  groups  as under-
wear and woven shirts.
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This paper-  a product  of the  Intemational  Trade  Division,  Intemational  Economics  Department-  is part
of a larger effort in the department  to analyze  the effects  of the Multi-Fibre  ArrAngement  on developing
countries.  The study  was funded  by the  Bank's Research  Support  Budget  under research  project  "Licence
Prices  and Rent  Sharing  in the  Multi-Fibre  Arrangement"  (RPO  676-69).  Copies  of the  paper  are available
free from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street  NW, Washington,  DC  20433. Please  contact  Aban Daruwala
room S7-042,  extension  33713  (September  1993,  35 pages).
Bamnister  investigates  market power  and the  Bannister  tests the existence  of perfect
distribution  of rents in the market  for Mexico's  markets  and rent-sharing  for six groups  of
exports of apparel to the United  States  under the  Mexican  apparel  exports to the United  States
Multi-Fibre  Arrangement  (MFA).  between 1981  and 1990:  sweaters,  trousers,
men's coats,  women's coats, woven  shirts, and
Conventional  wisdom  holds that voluntary  underwear.
export restraints,  such as those under the MFA,
are superior  to other kinds of trade barriers  There are consistent  differences  between  the
because they allow  developing  countries  to  unit value of U.S. production  and the Mexico
receive  the scarcity rents from  quantity  restric-  export  f.o.b. price of apparel  in the U.S. market
tions. Recently  a number  of studies  have ques-  adjusted  for tariffs and transport  costs. The
tioned this orthodoxy.  adjusted  price of Mexican  exports  is consistently
below the price for U.S. production,  which
Erzarn,  Krishna,  and Tan (1991),  in particu-  suggests  that rent-sharing  may be taking  place.
lar, have pointed  out that if market power  exists
only on the side of the importers,  they  can  Using  modifications  of the methods  of
acquire some of the fixed  rents resulting  from  Erzan,  Krishna,  and Tan (1991), Bannister  tests
quotas, in a form of "rent-sharing."  altemative  explanations  for the price difference
- differences  in the composition  of Mexican
In Mexico's case, rents resulting  from MFA  exports  and U.S.  production,  and differences  in
restrictions  are probably  small,  since few of the  the quality  of Mexican  exports and U.S. prod-
quotas imposed  are binding.  And other  institu-  ucts.
tional arrangements  - such as production-
sharing  under HTS  9802 and a liberal  quota  The existence  of differences  in composition
regirne  for goods  made with U.S. inputs  - between  Mexican  exports  and U.S. production  is
further  mitigate the MFA's restrictiveness.  rejected  for three of the six groups.  Bannister
also controls  for the existence  of significant
Mexican  exporters  probably  receive  only a  quality differences.
fraction  of available  rents, says Bannister.  The
welfare  implications  of MFA restrictions,  and of  The results  indicate  that rent-sharing  may
market imrperfecdons  that might lead to rent-  exist for woven  shirts and underwear  (two of the
sharing,  are thus not as significant  in Mexico  as  three groups  in the samnple  that are consistently
they  might be in countries  for which  conditions  quota-bound).  U.S. importers  may receive  up to
are more restrictive.  But even for the few rents  4'I oercent of available  rents.
generated  in MeAico's  case, some rent-sharing  is
taking  place.
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Voluntary  export restraints (VERs)  are widespread  in world trade in textiles and apparel.
About 80 percent of world trade in textile and clothing, chiefly from developing  to developed
countries, is restricted  by voluntary  export restraints through various bilateral agreements  which
constitute  the Multi-Fibre  Arrangement  (MF'A).  The MFA allows industrialized  countries  to negotiate
quantitative  restrictions  on specific  toxtile and clothing  items with individual  developing country
exporters. Exporting countries  administer  the quantitative  restrictions, and, according to the
conventional  wisdom, reap the benefits  of restricted  supply in the importing  countries  thrcugh higher
prices.
A number  of studies have recently questioned  whether  such benefits are really forthcoming.
One approach  points out the considerable  welfare  costs for exporters  that may arise from the
imposition  of VERs. 1 A second approach,  followed  in this paper, looks at the implications  of
imposing  VERs in imperfectly  competitive  markets. The customary  view of VERs assumes  perfect
competition  in both the exporter's market for quota licenses, and the importer's market for each
developing  country's export  product, with monopoly  power existing  only at the level of the country  as
a whole. The main result of these assumptions  is that prices are set by the market, both for export
licenses  and for VER-restricted  products, but are exogenous  to the exporters  and importers. With
perfect competition  in the quota license market, the level of the rent (the q'iota premium), is also
given exogenously  to economic  agents. The assumption  of perfect competition  thus simplifies  the
analysis  considerably  by ignoring  the institutional  details of market structure and quota administration
IDe Melo and Winters  (1990), for example,  point out that there are considerable  welfare  costs for exporters that
arise from the imposition  of VERs.  The first cost is the efficiency  loss due to government  intervention  in quota
allocation  rather than allowing  for a straight auction  of export rights.  Even  more significant,  however,  is the
loss from the misallocation  of resources  that  results in production  and factor markets,  even  in the absence  of
government  intervent;on  in the quota allocation  mechanism.  The contractionary  pressure  on the industry subject
to a VER can force factors  out of industries  in which  they are most productive,  and hence  lead to significant
efficiency  losses for exporters. These losses must be balanced  against  the rent transfers  from abroad. An
empirical  evaluation  of VERs on Taiwan  exports  of footwear  to the US. by Hamilton, De Melo and Winters
(1992) indicates  that they result in a net welfare loss for exporters  in spite of the rent transfer. Martin and
Suphachalasai  (1990) also  point to potential  losses from depressed  prices in residual  markets  in the context of the
MFA.Mexico  MFA  2
that affect  the market price under imperfect  competition. When we allow for imperfect  competition,
however, the institutional  details of price setting  become essential  to any investigation  of the quota
restrictions. Allowing for the possibility of market power, either in the market for export licenses  on
the supply side or on the part of US. retaile:s on the demand  Fide,  has implications  for the existence
and distribution of rents that accrue from the MFA between exporters  and importers.
The theoretical  aspects  of imperfect  markets in quota all3cation  and the effects  of VERs in
imperfectly  competitive  markets have been studied  by Krishna  (1990, 1992), Krugman  and Helpman
(1989), and empirically  investigated  in Aw (1992), Erzan, Krishna  and Tan (1991, 1992)  and Krishna
and Tan (1992). Erzan, Krishna and Tan describe  the implications  of imperfect  competition  for the
distribution of reints  under the MFA. They make  the crucial  distinction  between "rent-appropriation"
and  'rent-sharing."  When exporters  have market power, they can set product prices to appropriate
scarcity rents that accrue from quota  restrictions. In this case, the size of the quota premium, (equal
to the value of a license to export one unit of the quota restricted  good) is det;rmined by the exporLer.
Erzan, Krishna  and Tan call this rent-appropriation. In contrast, when market power is on the
buyer's side, the quota premium is a result of conditions  in the quota  restricted market, and is
exogenous  for both the exporter and the importer. The importer can then use market power only to
extract some share of the fixed quote -ent.  'Vhen this occurs, the value of a license to export one unit
of the quota constrained  good will fall short of the quota premium, and hence only a fraction of the
possible quota rent will accrue to the exporter. This is referred to as rent-sharing. Erzan, Krishna
and Tan (1991) devise econometric  tests for the presence  of rent-sharing  under imperfect  competition,
and apply them to Hong Kong exports of clothing  to the US. restmcted  under the MFA.  They
estim  3 the extent of rent-sharing,  and find the potential  rent was split unevenly  between  the U.S.
and Hong Kong, with the U.S. share ranging  from 48 per cent for skirts to 94 per cent for play suits.
This paper investigates  the case of Mexico's  exports of apparel to the U.S. under the MFA.
As the fifth most important  exporter of apparel into the U.S. market, Mexico  should be part of any
study that measures  the distribution  of rents accruing from the MFA. Because  of the institutional
arrangements  that govern trade between  the U.S. and Mexico,  however, Mexico  presents a particularMexico  MFA  3
chIlenge.  First, there is no organized market  for export licenses  in Mexico, and hence no explicit
export license price. 2 Quota constrained  exports are allocated  to potpntial  exporters on a historical
basis. The implication  of this arrangement  is that there may be a high degree of concentration  in the
quota allocation  for those products in which  the quota is binding. Second, Mexican  exports of
apparel to the U.S. are influenced  by market sharing arrangements  that allow assembly  of apparel in
Mexico  using U.S. inputs for:  ,-export  to the U.S.  This trade may  be within the same firm with
operations  in both the U.S. and Mexico,  or may be the result of subcontracting  arrangements  between
U.S. firms and Mexican  assembly  operations. Either of these ariangements  has implications  for
export  pricing strategies and market power relationships  that affect rent-sharing. Third, even the
quotas  negotiated  under the MFA have liberal provisions  under an arrangement  which essentially
eliminates  the restrictiveness  of the MFA for Mexican  exports produced  with U.S. inputs. This
arrangement,  known as the Special  Regime, went into effect in 1989, and clearly has some influence
on whether  quotas are binding and whether  rents exist. Finally, it should also be noted  that very few
of the quotas imposed  on Mexican  exports are actually  binding, so thLt even excluding  the effects of
the institutional  arrangements  described  above, the potential  rents accruing from MFA export
restraints are probably  very small. Thus, the welfare effects  of quota  restrictions on Mexican  exports,
and of market imperfections  that might lead to rent sharing, are probably not large.  Nevertheless,
this case provides a suitable test for the existence  of perfect markets  and rent-sharing,  with some
bearing  for a more sober assessment  of the effects of MFA restrictions  on developing  countries.
The first section  of this paper contains  a description  of the institutional  arrangements  that
affect Mexican  exports of apparel to the United  States under the MFA and their implications  for the
existence  and distribution  of rents.  The second section investigates  the existence  of rent-sharing  more
directly  by comparing  the price of Mexican  apparel exports to the United States under the MFA with
U.S. prices for similar g-:ds.  Under the assumption  of perfectly  competitive  output markets,
arbitrage in the.  iporter's n',  (i.e. in the U.S.) will lead to these two prices being cqual
2Thc  transfer  of export rights is illegal, and there is no evidence  of informal  mnarkets  for these.Mexico  MFA  t
(assuming  that impons are sufficiently  close substitutes  for home  production),  since the Mexican  price
of exports includes  the implicit  valu  of a license to export  the quota  restricted  product. Any
difference  between  the two prices could be an indication  of rent-sharing. The data indicate  that
Mexican  export prices are consistently  below the price of U.S. production. However, there are
.0ternative  explanations  for these price differences.  Chief among  these is the difference  in the
composition  of the groups of Mexican  exports and U.S. production, or differences  in the quality of
the two products. Subsequent  sections  test for these differences  and find that only in three of the six
groups of apparel tested can differences  in composition  be definitively  ruled out.  Rent sharing
estimates  for two remaining  groups that are quoa bound indicate  that, when differences  in quality are
accounted  for,  U.S. retailers may have received  up to 49 cents  of every dollar in rents.Mexico  MFA  S
1.  Institutional  Arrangements
1.1  Export l3censing
Textile and apparel exports from Mexico  to the U.S. under the MFA are restricted  by visas
which allow Mexico  exports to pass through U.S. custonms.  They are not restricted at the point of
exit by Mexican  customs officials. The export visas aLe  distributed  by Mexican  officials according  tc
the amount  of quota negotiated  under the MFA. First prioritv to fill the quota is given to firms that
exported  in the previous year.  Any left over quota is distributed  to new entrants in the market. After
the initial allocation,  firms can increase  their share of quota when there is unused quota quantity
available,  and when  tne firm can show that it has alreadv exported  70 percent of -ts initial allocation.
Visas are specific to a particular  consignment,  and are valid from the date of ibsuance  until December
31 of the same year.
What are the implications  of this arrangement? The fact that the initial allocation  of export
permits (visas)  does not take place through an auction mechanism  meals tiat any rent created  by the
export  restrictions benefits  the exporter rather than the government. further, since visas are
distributed  on a historical  basis it is probable  that significant  concentration  exists in the distribution  of
these rents.  Although  there is no market for export  permits, there is an unobservable  iniplicit
valuation  the exporter confers on the export visa, which is equal to the amount  he/she would be
willing to pay for the right to export. To the extent that quotas are bindIng, this shadow  price is
positive, although it will vary from firm to firm. If quotas are not binding, the implicit  price is zero.
For a binding quota, this implicit  price will be equal to the quota  premium or the unit rent created  by
the quantity restrictions, and will be included  in the F.O.B. price of Mexican  exports to the U.S. that
are restricted  under the MFA.
1.2  Trade Regimes
Two different institutional  arrangements  operate to diminish  the trade barriers to Mexican
apparel exports entering the U.S.  The first of these is the provision under chapter 9802.00 of the
harmonized  tariff schedule  (HTS 9802.00) that allows for special treatment of goods assembled  inMexico  MFA  6
Mexico  from U.S. components. This provision allows American  apparel firms to export cut cloth fcr
assembly  in Mexico's in-bond industry (the maquiladora industry) and re-import  the final goods,
paying  tariffs only on the value added in Mexico. In most cases, the facilities in Mexico  used for
assembly  are owned  by U.S. firms, so that Mexican  apparel exports entering  the U.S. under HTS
9802.00 consticute  movements  of goods  within the same firm, even though  they Are  registered as
imperts into the U.S. under the MFA (USITC, 1991). HTS 9802.00 is essentially  a tariff provision,
but it has implications  for rent sharing. If rents exist, then U.S. firms with assembly  operations in
Mexico  owning a large snare of the quota will be the principal  beneficiaries  of the quota restrictions. 3
The evidence  in Table 1 shows that for Mexican  apparel exrports  to the U.S. this is probably  the case.
From 1988 to 1991 between  85 and 90 percent of all Mexican  appare' exports under the MFA entered
the U.S. under HTS 9802.00 provisions, with between  60 and 70 percent of their value added  in the
U.S.
Table 1. Percentage of MFA Exports from Mexico to the U.S.
Entering Under HTS 9802.00
1988  1989  1990  1991
U.S.  U.S.  U.S.  "J.S.
9802.00  Value  9802.00  Value  9802.00  Value  9802.00  Value
Added  Adided  Added  Added
All  MFA  72.2  69.3  76.87  61.5  73.2  65.7  75.5  66.2
Apparl  84.9  69.4  90.68  61.5  88.32  66.3  89.52  66.3
Other  28.3  68.9  30.08  61.5  28.01  63.5  29.27  66.01
Source:  U.S.  Department  of Commerce,  Office  of Textiles.
The second institutional  arrangement  affecting  Mexican  exports of apparel into the U.S. is a
special provision of the MFA known as the Special  Regime. It effectively  eliminates  quotas under the
MFA for apparel assembled  in Mexico  from fabric cut and formed in the U.S.  The test for eligibility
for the Special Regime quota treatment  is more stringent  than that for HTS 9802.00 tariff provisions
3This is not a case particular to Mexico. Large U.S. importers  that also manufacture  and assemble  appaiel
overseas,  such as Liz Claiborne, often  have claims  to large fractions  of available  quota in developing  countries.Mexico  MFA  7
since the former requires that fabric be formed  and cut in the U.S. while the latter only requires the
cutting to take place in the U.S.  Although  Special  Regime quotas a, e often filled, they are
administered  in such a way that utilization  rates have been allowed  to exceed 100 percent. Thus it
may appear that rents exist for those exports that entei the U.S. under the Special regime  vhen, in
fact, no rents  are being generated. The special regime was instituted  in 1988, although it only became
effective  in 1989. In 1990,  43.5 percen; of apparel exports fromn  Me-  ico into the U.S. under the
MFA entered under the Special  Regime.4
In addition  to the special regime, there are different quota arrangements  within the MFA that
affect the restrictiveness  of tht quotas.  rhere are three types uf quotas: specific limits, desigi .ed
levels, and consultation  mechanisms. A specific limit quota is a quantity  constraint which increases  at
a fixed rate per year (in most cases six percent, with the exception  of cotton fiber which increases at
two percent per year).  If the quantity restriction  is met, then a specific limit quota is binding. A
designated  level is an informal barrier whose restrictiveness  depends  oin  the discretion of the
administrators  of the quota in the United  States. Mexican  officials can request  an increase in the
quota for a specific  year which may or may not be granted depending  on the 'J.S.  administrator's
judgment as to what effect this will have on the U.S. market. 5 Finally,  consultation  mechanisms
inpose no quantitative  limit, but establish  a mechanism  by which the U.S. can consult with Mexico
when exports are perceived  to be affecting  the U.S. market adversely. In practice, these consultat;on
mechanisms  have not been binding.
The arrangements  described  above  affect a very large proportion  of Mexican  exports of
apparel to the United States. Table 2 shows how " ay  affect the groups of apparel that have been
most bound by quota arrangements  between 1981  and 1990.6 The first column  shows the average rate
of quota utili7ation  (quantity  of exports/quota). In general, a consistent  quota utilization  rate of 90
4For a more detailed  description  of these  arrangements  and their implications  for textile trade under the North
American  Free Trade  Agreement,  see Bannister  and Low, (1992).
5According  to officials  from the Department  of Commerce,  there are some MFA categories  in which petitions
for increase  of the design'ted levels  have been  denied, so that there is reason to believe that at least in some cases
these  quotas  are binding  also.
6The composition  of these  groups  is discussed  in the Appendix.Mexico  MFA  8
percent or above may be considered  to indicate  that the quota is binding.  The groups in Table 2 are
aggregations  of M.FA  categories,  some of which were quota  bound and some of which were not.  In
addition, not all groups were bound in all years.  The most consistently  bound groups were trousers,
woven sh'rts and linderwear. Of the groups presented  only sweaters  did not have a significant
component  of exports entering the U.S. under HTS 9802,00; between 80 and 90 percent of the
exports of all other groups entered  under HTS 9802.00, with an average  value added in Mexico
between  43 percent for shirts and 22 percent for unierwear.  This suggests  that some of the rents
accruing from the MFA in these  producL.  are captured by U.S. firms assembling  apparel in wMexico.
Under type of quota, all w re subject  to either designated  consultation  levels or specific limits, except
for sweaters, which were only subject  to consultation  mechanisms.
Trousers, woven shirts, and underwear,  being the most tightly constrained  groups of exports,
are probably  where the rents, if any, are being generated. 7 Yet, as shown in the last column  of Table
2, a high proportion  of these exports in these groups entered  the U.S. under the Special  Regime and
thus are eftectively  not bound, at least from 1989  on.  Table 2 thus reinforces  the contention  that
available  rents from MFA quota restrictions  are small, and under the most optimistic  assumption  that
exporters  receive  all the rent, Mexican  producers still capture only a portion.
7In  the  analysis  that follows  we consider  these  to be the  quota  bound  groups.Mexico MFA  9
Table  2.  Summary  data  for  Apparel  Exports
Average  Average  Average  Average
Group  Quota  Percent  of  Percent  Type  Percent
Utilization  MFA under  Value  of  Special
9802  Added  Quota  Regime
(1981-90)  (1987-90)  in U.S.  (1988-90)
1. Sweaters  38.10  1.20  33.00  cm  00.00
2. Trousers  70.70  83.10  67.30  di/sI  83.70
3. Men's Coats  42.90  88.20  65.50  dl  4.60
4. Women's Coats  51.80  80.10  70.10  di/sl  29.20
5. Woven  Shirts  63.40  89 70  57.70  sI  74.20
6. Underwear_  59.30  82.30 _  78.30  dl/sl  59.70
S,urce: World  Bank  data tapcs  and U.S. Department  of Commerce  data.
cm-consultation mechanism;  dl-designated level; sl=specific limit.Mexico  iFA  10
2.  Testing  tor Rent-Sharing
2.1  The Data
Thc data used for this study are similar to those used by Erzan, Krishna  and Tan (EKT).
Because  of conflicting  classification  systems  between  U.S. data and MFA import data the categories
used were aggregated  in the same fashion as the EKT data, choosing  groups of apparel that minimized
the differences  between U.S. production  groupings  and aggregate  MFA category groupings. Six
industry groups were examined:  sweaters, trousers, men's coats, women's coats, woven  shirts, and
underwear.8 The data include observations  for the following  variables  from 1981  to 1990, where j
indicates  the apparel group, and t indicates  the year:
pitUS=  the unit value of U.S. production.
pjtm =  F.O.B. price of apparel imports  from Mexico.
tjt  =  Ad valorem tariff in the U.S.
Tit  =  Unit transport cost from Mexico  to the U.S.
pitm  =  Adjusted  Mexico  price, where pjtm  =  pjtm (1 +tj  ) +  Tjt 9
QjUS  =  U.S. sales  of U.S. production.
Qitm  e  Mexican  exports  to the U.S. market.
Hjt  =  Numbers  equivalent  of the Herfindahl  index  of concentration  among Mexican  exporters.
Vit  =  Quota level for Mexican  exports to the U.S.
Uit  =  Quota utilization  rate defined  as Ui, =  Qjtm  /Vit
The sources and composition  of these data are found in the data appendix.
tThe composition  of these  groupings  in terms of MFA categories  is explained  in the appendix.
9A further adjustment  was made  to the unit value  of Mexican  exports to take into account  the lower tariff rates
levied  on imports  with a high proportion  of U.S. content  under the production  sharing arrangements  codified  in
HTS 9802.00.Mexico  MFA  11
2.2  The Price  Differences
As mentioned  above, the implicit  valuation  of the quota rents is included in the Mexican
F.O.B. price of exports to the U.S.  Thus, we can test for rent-sharing  by comparing  the unit value of
U.S. production  with the Mexican  F.O.B. price, appropriately  adjusted  for tariffs, transport costs,
and HTS 9802 tariff concessions. Arbitrage in the U.S. market will cause  these two prices to
equalize  if markets are competitive  and all goods are homogeneous  within each group.  It is
reasonable  to assume  that Mexican  exporters  are small, and therefore price-takers,  in the U.S. market.
However, if U.S. importers  have monopsony  power, this can lead to rent-sharing, if they can
maintain  a lower price for their imports  than they pay for U.S. production.
Chart 1 plots the adjusted  Mexican  F.O.B. price on the vertical axis against the U.S. price on
the horizontal  axis for all six groups of products examined  in this study.  The arrow represents  the
forty-five  degree line.  The chart clear!y shows that there is a significant  difference  between  the two
prices. The U.S. price is above the Mexican  price in almost every instance, inaicating that either
sustained  quality or composition  differences  or rent-sharing  may exist. To test the significance  of this
difference,  the following  regression  was run using time series data from 1981  to 1990, pooled over
the six apparel groups:
(1)  pjm  =  a +  ppjtuS + yHjt + 8Ujt + fVjt + ejt
At this point the variation  over groups of apparel is not considered,  and so a  is maintained  constant.
As Erzan, Krishna, and Tan point out, in this equation,  the right hand side variables can be
considered  exogenous  to the Mexican  exporter. If there is no rent sharing, and markets are perfectly
competitive,  and if all goods are assumed  homogeneous  within  g,oups, then pj,m  =  pjtUs.  In this case
we expect the coefficient  on the U.S. price not to be significantly  different from one, and all other
parameters  not to be significantly  different  from zero.  If, on the other hand, rent sharing exists,
implying  monopoly  power on the part of U.S. importers,  or the assumption  of homogeneous  goods is
violated (by differences  in quality or composition,  for example),  then we expect the coefficient  on pulMexico  MFA  12
to be different from unity, and the coefficients  on the other variables  to be significant. Hjt, the
numbers equivalent  of the Herfindahl  index, is an indicator  cf concentration  in export license holdings
among  Mexican exporters. 10 All other things being equal, an increase in concentration  will afford
Mexican  exporters greater bargaining  power vis-A-vis  U.S. importers, allowing  them to retain a
higher share of the rent,11 In this case, we expect  the coefficie.,:  on the Herfindahl  index  to be
positive. The quota level VjP,  and the rate of quota utilization  Ujt, reflect conditions  in the supply  of
export licenses and the restrictiveness  of the quota. All other things being equal, we expect an
increase in the quota level to reduce the implicit export  license price and hence for the coefficient  on
this tern to be negative. An increase  in the utilization  rate, on the other hand, will make export
licenses more scarce, and hence increase  their implicit  price.  Under the hypothesis  of rent-sharing,
we thus expect the coefficient  on Uj, to be positive.
1I 0Te numbers  equivalent  of the  Herfindahl  index  is calculated  as liZ si where  si is firm  i's share  of license
holdings.  In our application  the  shares  are weighted  by the  number  of firms  in each  apparel  group.  See  the
Appendix  for details.
IlIn the  extreme  case  where  there  is one  monopsonist  importer  in the  U.S. and all import  licenses  are  held  by
one exporter  in Mexico,  Erzan,  Krishna  and  Tan  (1991)  show  that  if the  license  price  is determiined  by the
outcome  of a Nash  bargaining  process,  the  license  price  is proportional  to the  level  of the  exporter's  bargaining
power.Mexico  MFA  13
Figure 1
Scatter Plot, All Apparel  Groups
Mexico  (Prie per unit in U.S. dollars)
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Table 3a. Regression  Results for Equation  1 - Linear Specirlcation.
Independent  All Groups  Bound  Groups  Unbound  Groups
Variables  (2,5,6)  (1,3,4)
Intercept  2.4515 A  0.6050 b  4.6597 a
(0.5964)  (0.3146)  (0.9263)
Pjtu'  0.4094 9  0.4676 A  0.4474 A
.______________  (0.0257)  (0.0310)  (0.0478)
ujt  -0.8343  -0.2752  -2.483  c
_______________________  (0.9247)  (0.4502)  (1.4850)
Vjt  -2.29 X 10-8  -6.79 X 10-9  6.21 X 10i7
(2 X 108)  (I X lo-8)  (7 X 10-7)
Hijt  -0.0012  0.0029  -0.0153 b
(0.0022)  (0.0011)  (0.0075)
Adj. R2 0.872  0.942  0.775
# observations  60  30  30
t Test,  =  _1  -22.89 reject '  -17.16  reject  A  -11.5  reject a
F Test,  ,=1 and  338.71 reject  '  292.09 reject &  268.81 reject '
Standard  errors in parentheses.
A Significant  at 1 percent.
b Significant  at 5 percent.
c Significant  at 10 percent.
Table 3a presents the results of running regression (1) on all groups, the quota bound groups
and non-bound  groups.12 The first significant  result is that for all three regressions  the hypothesis  of
perfect competition  (3=1 and a=y=5=4=0)  and the hypothesis  that the coefficient  on the U.S. price ,B
is equal to one, are both rejected. While this does not confirm  the existence  of rent sharing, it is
consistent  with the rejection  of the hypothesis  of perfect competition  in the market for Mexican  export
to the U.S. in these groups of apparel. The intercept and the coefficient  on the U.S. price are
significant  in all three regressions. In this context, the intercept  can be interpreted  as refiecting  the
effects  of any fixed difference  between  the two prices common  to all groups  of apparel (the "fixed
component"),  and the coefficient  on the U.S. price reflects the change  in the Mexican  price for every
12Tbe  definition  of the  groups  is based  on the  data  in Table  2.Mexico  MFA  15
unit change  in the U.S. price, all other hings held equal (the 'marginal component").  13
The fact that the intercept  and the coefficient  on the U.S. price are significant  in all three
regressions  does not allow us to say anything  about the probable cause of the price differences. It is
interesting  to not, however, that the fixed  component  on the bound group is significantly  lower than
the one on the unbound  group, although  the marginal  components  are similar in magnitude.1 4 One
obvious possible interpretation  for this is that at least part of the difference  between the two prices is
being captured by exporters in Mexico  in the form of quota  rents, reflected in a higher price of
Mexican  exports. This interpretation  is supported  by the coefficient  on the numbers equivalent  of the
Herfindahl index, which is positive  and significant  for the bound group, but negative  and significant
for the unbound  group.
To test the robustness  of the results in Table 3a, an alternative  specification  of the model in
the logarithms  of the variables was used.  Under this specification,  the coefficient  on the log of the
U.S. price can be interpreted  as an elasticity  of price transmission,  while the other coefficients  can be
interpreted  as elasticities  reflecting  the effects of the different characteristics  of the quota-license
market on the Mexican  FOB price. The constant  term can be interpreted  as a proportional  shift
parameter. To determine  whether  the log specification  is superior to the linear specification  in (1), a
Box-Cox  test for model specification  was used.  1 5 The test consists  of comparing  the sum of squared
residuals  of the two models after performing  a simple  transformation  of the data.  The sum of squared
residuals  for the linear specification  was 4.163.  For the log-linear  specification  it was 2.289.  We
thus can conclude  that the log-linear  specification  fits the data better.
The results of the regression in logs are presented  in Table 3b.  As before, the hypothesis  of
perfect competition  (p  = 1 and a;y=y-4=0) is rejected  for all three regressions. However, it is
13Later  in the paper we allow the intercept  to vary across  groups to explore the possibility  that the fixed
component  can be explained  by group-specific  fixed  differences  in quality  between  U.S. production  and imports
from Mexico.
14Chow  tests  were run to see if the coefficients  for the bound and the unbound  groups were significantly
different from each other. Tle tests  rejected  the null hypothesis  that there was no difference  between  the groups
at the one percent level.
15For a description  of the Box-Cox  test see Maddala  (1992) p. 220 or Fombv et al. (1984) p. 423.Mexico  MFA  16
interesting  to note that the hypothesis for P = 1 cannot  be rejected for the unbound  groups. In contrast
with the linear specification,  the intercept  terms cease to be significantly  different froin zero.
However, the coefficient  on the log of the U.S. price is significant  at the one percent level for all
groups, and  the coefficient  on the log of the utilization  rate is significant  at the fire and ten percent
level.  The log of the Herfindahl  index is significant  and negative  at the five percent level for the
unbound  groups.  Although  it is difficult  to interpret  the negative  coefficients  on Uit and Hjt , these
results are not inconsistent  with those of the linear moecification,  or with the hypothesis  of rent-
sharing for the bound groups of apparel.
Table 3b. Regression  Results for Equation  1 - Log-linear  Specification.
Independent  All Groups  Bound  Groups  Unbound  Croups
Variables  (2,5,6)  (1,3.4)
Intercept  0.2639  0.3082  0.9294
(0.4178)  (1.1384)  (0.9968)
log pjtus  0.8090 A  0.8027 a  0.8752 a
(0.0491)  (0.0450)  (0.1209)
log Ujt  -0.0995 c  -0.1003 c  -0.1776 b
(0.0660)  (0.0735)  (0.1012)
log Vjt  -0.0244  -0.0525  -0.0166
(0.0248)  (0.0552)  (0.0857)
log Hjt  -0.0211  0.0759  -0.2501 b
(0.0583)  (0.0674)  (0.1293)
Adj. R2 0.939  0.976  0.735
# observations  60  30  30
t Test, P= 1  -3.889 reject a  4.377  reject a  -1.031 cannot reject '
F Test,  P=1 and  97.093 reject a  97.096 reject '  49.113 reject '
Standard  errors in parentheses.
a Significant  at 1 percent.
b Significant  at 5 percent.
C Significant  at 10 percent.Mexico  MFA  17
2.3 Testing Differences in Composition
Although  the results in the previous section  seem to indicate  the possible existence  of rent
sharing, there are other porible  explanations  for the difference  between  the Mexican export price and
the U.S. price.  One possible explanation  is a difference  in the composition  of the groups of apparel,
with Mexican  exports concentrating  on the lower value MFA categories  that make up the groups, and
U.S. products concentrating  on the high value end.  As explained  in the data appendix, each of the
groups examined  is an aggregation  of categories  in the MFA export data and different categories  of
U.S. production  data.  The problem  faced when attempting  to compare  the unit value of U.S.
production  to the unit value of Mexican  exports under the MFA is that at the most disaggregated
levels the two category  groupingc  are not compatible. In aggregating  Lhem to the  more comparable
group levels, some compositional  bias is inevitable,  and it may show up in the marginal  rent-sharing
parameter  f3,  the coefficient  on pjtur,  or in the intercept  term. This section  tests whether  the price
differences  detected  above can be explained  entirely  by this compositional  bias.  If composition  bias
cannot  be ruled out, then the assumption  of homogeneous  product groups cannot  be maintained  and
some accounting  for product  differences  must be made.
The procedure for testing compositional  differences  follows that of Erzan, Krishna, and Tan
(1991), with some modifications  to allow  for a more efficient  estimation  of the parameters  and to
explicitly  test the assumptions  underlying  the test procedure. The aggregate  prices can be
decomposed  into their production  weighted  components  as follows:
(2)  pu  =  piju.  (Qiju/  =  piju.  wjus  i,...,n,  j1,...,6
where the subscript i refers to the category  belonging  to apparel group j. Qijus  is the quantity  of U.S.
output in category i of group  j,  and QJUu  is total output in group  j.  Hence wijUs  is the quantity weight
cF  category  i in group  j of U.S. production. Similarly,  for Mexico:
(3)  pjm (Qj/Qj)  =  i  Wij,  i=  ,...,n,  j=1,...,6.
i  IMexico  MFA  is
The difference  between  the Mexican  export F.O.B. price and the U.S. unit value of production  at the
group level can then be expressed:
(4)  pjm pjU  =  - ppjmw  p  im  wpij  us  .wus
Data only exist for pjm,  pjus,  pfm, axid  wim. To get around this problem we assume  that the following
relationship  holds for each sub-group  (MFA category)  i within each group  j:
(5)  pjm =  cj  +  p,jPiUs +  P2jXjj +  edj .
where Xij is a  general term for the independent  variables included  in equation  (1): the level of the
quota, the utilzation rate, and the Herfindahl  index  of concentration  in export  supply.  Note that we
assume  a, Pl,  and P2 are constant  over all the members  of each group  j.  Solving for pjus  and
substituting  into (4) yields:
(6)  pjm - pjus  =  yj +  E  (wij m - sljwiiu)pijm  +  82j  wijuaxi, +  51j  wijuseij .
i  I
where yj = cj/plj  , 8j  =  I/Plj  , and 82j  =  P2j/Pjj . With one key assumption we can estimate
equation  (6) and test the coefficient  on pijm  to see if the composition  effect is statistically  significant.
The assumption  is that 82j = 0 for all j, that is, that the change  in the Mexican  export price is entirely
determined  by the change in the U.S. price, and variables such as quota levels, quota  utilization, and
concentration  have no systematic  effect. This seems to be a strong assumption,  but it is borne out in
the aggregate  by the results of estimating  equation  (1) for all groups. Introducing  this assumption,  the
regression equation  then becomes:
(6')  pjm  rpius  =  yj +  upijm  + uj
where 00 =  (wijm  - 8iwiju),  and uj = 8iIZwijuseiJ  In order for E(uj) =  0 and the regression to be
well specified, we have to make the additional  assumption  that the E(wije 1j)  = 0, that is , that the
U.S. quantity weights and the error term are independent  random  variables.Mexico  MFA  19
To test for significant  differences  in the U.S. and Mexican  category weights wUus  and wijm,  a
compositional  bias,  it is necessary  to impose  the additional  restriction  that 8Si,  the marginal
component  of the price relationship  in each group, is equal to 1.  16 When this is the case, the sum of
the coefficients on the p 1 m terms in equation (6') is equal to zero, since  wijm =  wiju  = 1 . We
can test the validity of this restriction  using a joint F test on the coefficients  of the pijm  terms in (6').
If the test cannot  reject the hypothesis  that  ejj = 0, then we take this to be sufficient  evidence  that
i
81j = 1.  At this point we can examine  the significance  of the individual  9ij coefficients  for evidence  of
a composition  effect, that is, a difference  between  wijm  and wij".  In addition, we can test the joint
hypothesis  that all the 90 coefficients  are equal to zero for further evidence  of a composition  effect.
If the hypothesis  that £  j  = 0 is rejected,  then we could  bring more information  to bear on
the problem. In particular, we can take advantage  of the fact that we know wijm  to test for the
difference  directly. First, note that an estimate  of 81i can be obtained  from the estimates  of the
coefficients Oij:
(7)  °lj  =  I- ;@
i
so that for each individual  category we can estimate  the U.S. share as:
(8) Wj 
We want to test whether  wijuS  is significantly  different from wijm,  that is, whether
16Erzan,  Krishna  and Tan (1991)  assume that this restriction  holds, but do not test it explicitly.Mexico  MFA  20
(9)  wom - h_,
eij
If the hypothesis in (9) is rejected  then significant  compositional  differences  exist.  Unfortunately  (9)
is a nonlinear hypothesis  that depends  on the distribution of wijm,  and is very u`fficult  to implement.
However, evan without testing (9) we can still obtain estimates  of 81j and examine  their significance.
The regressions in (6') were run together in a seemingly  unrelated  regression  framework  to
correct for contemporaneous  correlation  of the error terms due to exogenous  shocks  that might affect
them in a similar manner. It seems likely that in the case of Mexico  during the 1980s, such
correlation exists. 17 If contemporaneous  correlation  does exist, then the seemingly  unrelated
regression framewrrk will yield more efficient  estimates  of the coefficients."s
Table 4 presents the results of regressions  (6').  Differences  in composition  seem  to be
indicated  by significant  e coefficients  in group 1 at the one and five percent significance  level, in
groups 2 and 3 at the ten percent level, and in group 4 at the five percent level. However, without
testing whether 81j= 1 in each group we can have little confidence  in these coefficients  as indicators
that a composition  effect is at work. Table 5 presents the results of F tests.  The first column  tests for
the existence  of a marginal  effect, that is if 81j is different from one, which is implied  when the sum
of the 0jj coefficients  is not equal to zero.  Column  two tests for the composition  effect, that is if each
theta coefficient  is different from zero.  Column  three tests for the existence  of rent-sharing;  the joint
hypothesis  that both the intercept (the fixed rent sharing effect) and all the e coefficients  (which
include  81j , the marginal  component)  are equal to zero.  If the hypothesis  of in column one is not
rejected, then we can interpret  the results of the tests in columns  two and three.  If it is rejected, we
cannot continue, since a marginal  component 81j not equal to one could cause  us to erroneously  reject
the hypothesis  that no cornposition  effect exists.
The hypothesis  of no marginal  effect (51j =  1) can be rejected for groups 2 and 4.  Of the
17Economy  wide  events  such  as the  debt  crisis  in 1982  and the  subsequent  imposition  of exchange  controls  are
typical  events  that might  lead  to contemporaneous  correlation  of the  error  terms.
ItFor a discussion  of the  relative  efficiency  of seemingly  unrelated  regression  estimates  versus  OLS  estimates  see
Fomby,  Hill, and  Johnson,  (1984),  pp. 155-166.Mexico  MFA  21
remaining  groups 1, 3, 5, and 6, only in group 1 was the hypothesis  that no composition  effect was at
work rejected. For groups 1, 3, 5, and 6, the hypothes.s  that no rent-sharing  was in effect could be
rejected. Under the most conservative  assumptions,  then, we can test for rent-sharing  only in groups
3, 5, and 6 with the assurance  that no composition  effect will bias the results.Mexico  MFA  22
Table 4.  Coefricients  on the Regressicns Testing for the Composition Effect
Group 1  -4.412  1.178  a  0.638'  -0.537  &  0.579 c  0.409
(4.0  61)  (0.3018)  (0.160)  (0.1536)  (0.3496)  (1.0833)
Group 2  1.131  -0.428  -0.011  0.053  0.888 b
(1.8777)  (0.4093)  (0.0201)  (0.0355)  (0.4239)  _  ___
Group 3  2 3.0 59 b  -1. 5 54 b  0.010
___________  (8.3124)  1  (0.8387)  (0.0484)  ____.__
Group 4  22,570 A  4 5 72 b  0..129
(4.1507)  (0.2117)  (0.1340)
Group 5  5.896  1  0.076  -0.498  -0.039  0.011  -0.065
(3.4188)  _  (0,2967)_  (0.3835)  (0.0299)  (0.0483)  (0.4308)
Group 6  0.173  0.27A  -0.082
_____  ___  (0.1608) i  (0.2363)  (0.1146)
System weighted  R 2 = 0.8142.
Standard  errors in parenth^":.
' significant  at the one perce:rt  level.
b significant  at the five percent level.
C significant  at the ten rercent level.
Table  S. F-Tests  for Composition  Effect
Ho  = °  yj +  0ij  a  O
Ho:  0
No Marginal  Effect  No CoEDosition  No Rent Sharing
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _E  ff'e  ct_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Group I  F(1,34)  = 3.559  F(5,34)  = 15.71  F(6,34)=22.25
cannot reject  reject  reject
Group 2  F(1,34)=2895  (?)  (?)
reject  __
Group 3  F(1,34)=3.860  F(2.34)=2.194  F(3,34)=25.111
cannot reject  cannot reject  reject
C.roup  4  F(1.34)=7.287  (?)  (7)
______________________  reject
Group  5  F(1.34)=0.638  F(5,34)= 1.721  F(6,34)=40.774
cannot reject  cannot reject  reiect
Group 6  F(1,34)= 1.550  F(2,34)=0.824  F(3,34)= 13.534
canmot reject  cannot reiect  reject
Note: All rejections are at the one percent level.  Failure to reject is at  the five  percent level.Mexico  MFA  23
2.4 Testing tor Fixed  Differences  In Quality
Another factor that might explain  the difference  between  the price of  U.S. production  and the
Mexican  adjusted  F.O.B. import price is a difference  in the quality  of the apparel. If Mexican
imports  are perceived  to be of lower quality, they will receive  a lower price.  Mexican  exports will
then be imperfect  substitutes  for their U.S. counterparts, and the assumption  of homogeneous
products must be dropped. A test for the possible  existence  of differences  in quality can be developed
by first assuming  that such differences  are constant  over time.  It is then possible to control for the
unrneasurable  fixed difference  in quality between  U.S. and Mexican  products in each group (that is,
the proportion  of the spread between  the price of the two products that is d.te to fixed differences in
quality),  by inserting group-specific  dummies  in equation (1). In addition, including a time trend, Tt,
captures any constant  change  in the quality difference  between  the two periods.  At this stage, we
drop groups 1, 2, and 4, since composition  effects cannot  be ruled out in these products. The
regression equation  for the remaining  groups is:
(10)  pjtm  =  a6 +  o3D 3 +  a 5D 5 +  3'pjtl"  +  Y'Hjt  +  8'U.t  +  Vjt  +  rTt  +  ejt
where D3 and D5 are the dummies  for the respective  groups. Under this specification,  the constant
term a6 is equal to a'  +  PZ 6, where a'  is the fixed component  net of the effects of product
differentiation  (quality  differences),  7n  is an arbitrary constant, and Z6 is the price effect of differences
in quality in group 6.  The coefficients on the dummies are ai=n(Zi  - Z6), and ,'  is the marginal
component  net of product  quality differences.
The results of regression (10) for groups 3, 5, and 6 are presented  in Table 6.  The
coefficients  on D5 and D3, as well as the intercept  terms a3, a5,  and a6, are significant  at the one
percent level, indicating  that quality differences,  fixed over time, may be a significant  component  of
the difference  between the U.S. and the Mexican  price for these groups. The time trend coefficient  is
not significant.  Unfortunately,  we cannot distinguish  between  the fixed quality effect Zi and theMexico  MFA  24
fixed rent-sharing  coefficient  a'.19 However,  the coefficient  on the U.S. price in Table 6 is close to
zero and not significant. Only the coefficient  on the Herfindahl  index is significant  and positive as
expected.
Several tests can be performed  to gauge the importance  of the presumed  quality difference. If
the fixed  quality difference  can explain all the spread between  the U.S. and Mexican  prices then the
coefficient  on pjt'J would be equal to one, and all other coefficients,  excluding  the dummies  and the
intercept, would be equal to zero.  Tests for this hypothesis  are presented  below Table 6.  The t test
and F test for P3'  =  1 are rejected  at the one percent level.  The F test for f'  =  1 and the coefficients
on all other variables except the dummies  equal to zero is also rejected at the one percent level.
The fact that we have one group (3) whose  exports are not quota  bound may be an explanation
for the lack of significance  of the coefficient  on pjtus  To see whether  rent-sharing  exists for those
groups  that are quota bound, group 3 was dropped from the sample  and the regression  was re-
estimated. The results are presented  in Table 7.  The coefficient  on pjtus  is now positive at 0.514 and
significant  at the one percent level.  Of the other coefficients,  those on the Herfindahl index and the
time trend are significant. The positive coefficient  on the Herfindahl  index  suggests  that a small  part
of the spread between  the U.S. and Mexican  prices may be due to the existence  of concentration
among  Mexican  exporters. The negative  time trend coefficient  indicates  an increasing  discrepancy
between the Mexican  and U.S. prices over time which may be due to increasing  quality differentials.
The fact that neither the intercept  term, a6, nor the coefficient  on D5, nor the intercept  a5 are
significant  suggests that this effect was not specilic to either of the groups in the sample.  The tests
presented below Table 7 also reject the hypothesis  that fixed quality differences  are the sole
explanation  for the differences  between  the price of U.S. production  and the price of imports from
Mexico.
The results of Table 7 indicate  that the price difference  in groups 5 and 6 cannot be explained
19Although  we have been referring  to this constant  term as the fixed  rent-sharing  effect throughout  the paper it is
possible  that other considerations  aside from rent-sharing  or constant  quality  differences  may explain part of this
difference  between  the prices.  Other possible  explanations  might be fixed  costs in the quota allocation  system.Mexico  MFA  25
solely by fixed quality differences  between  U.S. and Mexican  apparel.  Furthermore, while we cannot
distinguish  between  the fixed component  of rent-sharing,  and the fixed quality effect, the results seem
to indicate  that for the quota bound group this fixed  effect is not very important. One interpretation  of
the coefficient  on the U.S. price is that for these two groups (woven  shirts and underwear), an
increase of one dollar in the U.S. price has led to an average increase  of 51 cents in the Mexican
price. This may be an indication  that U.S. retailers  are receiving  up to forty-nine  percent of the rent
from the MFA quota restrictions in these two groups of apparel.
Table 6.  Fixed Effects Quality Difference Regression
Groups 3, 5, and 6
Independent  Coefficient  t Statistic  Intercepts  ai  F Statistic  (1,22)
Variables  Ho: a*=  0
a6 1.299  2.644X
(0.4913)  _
pjtus  -0.136  -0.711
(0.1913)
Hjt  0.006  2.603 a
(0.0023)
ujt  -0.661  -1.348
(0.4902)
V  j t  -1.712x10- 9 -0.878
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _ _  _(2  X  10-8  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Tt  0.082  1.019
(0.0809)  .
D3 11.303  7.629 a  12.602  67.37  reject
__________  _________(1.4815)  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Ds  3.413  1.019 '  4.712  26.12 '  reject
.___  _  __  _  __  _  _  _  (0.8368)
Aujusted  R 2 0.98, n=30.
Standard  errors in parentheses.
a si-nifi:ant at one percent.
c significant at ten percent.
Hypothesis  Tests
1.  '  =  1, t statistic,  -5.938 , reject at one percent.
2.  '  =  1, F(1,22) =  154.778,  reject at one percent.
3.  '  - 1, y'  =  '=  '  =  0, F(4,22)=48.97,  reject at one percent.Mexico  MFA  26
Table 7.  Fixed  Effects Quality  Difterence  Regression
Bound  Groups 5 and 6
Independent  Coefficient  t Statistic  Intercepts  ai  F Statistic  (1,22)
Variables  Ho: a;=0
-a6  1 (o  5lo6.502  1.640c
(0.9162)  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
pjtuS  0.514  8.402 A
(0.0612)  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Hjt  0.008  1.788  b
(0.0045)
Uit  ~~-0.412  -0.451
(0.9133)  -0.4S___  _
Vjt  87.2x10 9 0.201
__  __  _  __  _  __  __J  X  0 )  __  _  _  __  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  __  _  _
[  Tt  -0.249  -1.956 b
___________________  (0.1275)
DS  -1.293  -1.258  0.209  0.025 cannot
(1.0282)  reject
Adjusted  R2 =  0.93, n=20.
' significant  at one percent.
b significant  at five percent.
c significant  at ten percent.
Hypothesis  Tests
1.  '  =  1, t statistic, -4.616 , reject at one percent.
2.  '  =  1, F(1,23) =  63.050, reject at one percent.
3.  '  =  1, y' = 8' =  *'  = 0, F(4,23)=83.107, reject at one percent.Mexico  MFA  27
A test for the log specification  of equation  (10) was also run, with the bound data grovwps  5
and 6.  Tle tests reveal that the linear specification  fits the data better.  Nevertheless,  the results of
the regression in logs, presented  in Table 8, are consistent  with the previous results in Table 7.
Coefficients  on the fixed effect dummies  and the constan;  are not significantly  different from zero,
suggesting  no fixed quality effect was operating. These results are supported by the hypotheses  tests
which reject the existence  of fixed quality  aifferences  as the sole explanation  for the price differences,
at the one percent level. The coefficient  on the U.S. price is significant  at the one percent level, with
an elasticity  of price transmission,  all other variables  held constant,  of 0.59.  The Herfindahl  index is
also significant  and positive at the ten percent level.  The only difference  is that the coefficients  on the
log  of the quota  level Vjt and the log of the utilization  rate Ujt are also significant  and negative. This
is the sign we would expect  for the quota level effect.Mexico  MFA  28
Table S. Fixed Effects Quality  Difterence  Regression
Bound Groups  5 and 6 - Le '  Specification
Independent  Coefficient  t Statistic  Intercepts  a3 F Statistic  (1,22)
Variables  Ho: a;=0
log a6 0.0374  0.086
.__ __  __  __ __  _  (0.4339)
log pt  0.591  5.6?89A
________________  _  Pjt(0.1048)  S.6?8  '
log Hjt  0°189  Ld.82  c
(0.1280)
log U 3 t  -0.101  -1.1143  b
(0.0519)
log Vjt  -0.186  -2.734 a
(0.0680)
log Tt  -0.004  0 249
(0.0169)  __  _
DS  0.106  0.583  -0.068  0.056  cannot
I  (0.1819)  _  _  reject
Adjusted  R2 =  0.98, n=20.
4 significant at one percent.
b significant  at five percent.
c significant  at ten percent.
Hythesis  Tests
1.  P' =  1, t statistic, 3.904 , reject at cne percent.
2.  P' =  1, F(1,23) =  15.247, reject at one percent.
3.  1' =  1, I'  = 8' = +'  = 0, F(4,23)=9.854, reject at one percent.
Test of Log Specification
Sum of squared residuals for the linear specification  =  0.28936
Sum of squared residuals for the log specification  =  0.34268Mexico  MFA  29
Conclusions
This paper has tested for the existence  of perfect markets and rent sharing in Mexican apparel
exports to the U.S. between 1981  and 1990. The tests were run on six apparel groups: sweaters,
trousers, men's coats, women's coats, woven shirts, and underwear. The data indicate  that there are
consistent  differences  between  the Mexican  export F.O.B. price of apparel in the U.S. market
adjusted  for tariffs and transport costs, and the unit value of U.S. production.  The adjusted  price of
Mexican  exports is consistently  below the price of U.S. production  indicating  that rent sharing may be
taking place.  Alternative  explanations  for the price differential  were tested using the methods  of
Erzan, Krishna, and Tan (1991) with modifications  to allow for more efficient  estimation  of the test
parameters  and to explicitly  test the assumption  underlying  the test procedure. The existence  of
differences  in composition  in the groups of Mexican  exports and U.S. production is rejected for three
out of the six groups mentioned. After ruling out differences  in composition  in three of the apparel
groups, the existence  of significant  quality differences  is also controlled  for.  The final result indicates
that rent sharing may exist in woven  shirts and underwear  (two out of the three groups in the sample
that are quota bound). In particular, U.S. importers  may obtain up to forty-nine  percent of available
rents.
In addition  to the tests of rent sharing, the paper reviews  the institutional  arrangements  that
exist between  the U.S. and Mexico  that make MFA quotas much less restrictive than they would
ordinarily be.  Because  of these arrangements  it is doubtful  that MFA restrictions  result in significant
rents that would benefit Mexican  exporters. In addition,  production-sharing  arrangements  suggest
that the small rents that are generated  may be going in large part to U.S. owned firms in Mexico.
The welfare  effects of quota  restrictions and rent sharing are thus probably  not very important  in this
case.Mexico  MFA  30
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Appendix : Data Sources and Calculations
The data presented in section 2.1 include  observations  from 1981 to 1990, and were taken
from the following  sources described  below. The aggregations  of the data follow the methods  used by
Erzan, Krishna and Tan (1991)  with some modifications  to deal with the special case of Mexico.
1. pjrus,  Unit value of U.S. production,  and Q 1tu3,  U.S. sales of U.S. production:
These variables were taken from data created  by Erzan, Krishna and Tan (1991) up to 1988.
Erzan, Krishna and Tan defined  and created  aggregations  of the U.S. data from the Current Industrial
Reports  published  by the U.S. Department  of Commerce,  Bureau  of the Census. The data for 1989  to
1991 were created  using their aggregation  method. The U.S. price of each of the six apparel groups
was computed  as a quantity weighted  average of the unit values  of the production categories  that made
np the group.  For example,  for each apparel group  j made  up of two or more production  categories
i, i= 1,..,n,  let pj denote  the unit price of the apparel  group, pij  denote the unit price of each
production  category in group  j,  and Qi, the quantity  produced  of category i in group j.  Then:
(A1)  pj =  (value  of production)j/(Quantity  of production);
Pj  =  2:i  -j  is 
Pi  ~ij  zPQij
PaQ
pj =  2  Pij  Z pijQij
2. Fj,m, The F.O.B. price of apparel imports from Mexico.  Oitm,  Mexican  export to the U.S. Market.
Vit, bfLoat.&level  for Mexican  exports.
Ihese were taken from the MFA database in the International  Trade Division of the
International  Economics  Department  at the World Bank. This data set contains  the customs value of
imports  of apparel, 20 the quantity imported  in square meter equivalents  (SME), the quota level, and
type of quota  that is applied, all at the level of the MFA category.  The unit price at the category
20,Ths  is the  price  actually  paid  or payable  for merchandise  when  it is sold  for  export  to the  U.S., excluding
U.S. import  duties,  freight,  insurance,  and  other  charges  incurred  in bringing  the  merchandise  to the  U.S. The
information  from  the  MFA  data  set is taken  from  the  U.S. Department  of Commerce,  Office  of Textiles,  Expired
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level was calculated  as the ratio of the customs  value of imports  to the quantity imported in SMEs.
This is consistent  with the U.S. production  data which are also in SMEs. The unit FOB price at the
MFA  category level was then aggregated  up to the group level ()  using an import quantity weighted
average as described  above. The quota at the group level was calculated  as the sum of the quota at
the category level.  Following Erzan, Krishna and Tan (1991)  the Utilization  rate was calculated  using
a quota-weighted  average.
3. Grou, definitions:
Each grouping of apparel used, both in the case  of U.S. production  and imports from Mexico,
is made up of a number  of different categories  or sub-groups. Unfortunately,  the categories  or sub-
groupings  for U.S. production  are not compatible  with the categories  or sub-groupings  under the
MFA. Thus, a higher level of aggregation  must be found at which these groups are comparable.
Erzan, Krishna and Tan (1991) devise  group definitions  which are broadly comparable  as follows:
Appendix  Table 1
Relation  Between  the MFA Categories  and U.S. Production  Categories
for Apparel Groupings
Apparel Group  MFA Category  U.S. Production  Category
1.  Sweaters  345, 445, 446, 645, 646  11, 36
2.  Trousers  347, 348, 447, 448, 647, 648  12, 13, 14, 15, 20, 21*, 24,
25,  26,44,  45*, 48*, 49, 51,
3. Men's Coats  334, 434, 634  3, 4, 16, 17, 21*, 23, 29
4. Women's Coats  335,  435, 635  37, 38, 39, 42, 45*, 47
5. Woven  Shirts  340, 341, 440  7, 8, 28, 33, 640, 641
6. Underwear  352, 652  57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63
From Erzan, Krishna and Tan (1991).
* jogging suits which comprise  both trousers and coats. Each group is credited  with half the quantity
and value figures in these items.
4. Tariffs and Transportation  Costs
These were taken from 1986 U.S. IM-145  Import Trade tapes. Since 1986 is the only year
for which reliable data are available, it was assumed  that the structure  of tariffs and transportationMexico  MFA  33
costs did not change significantly  during the period, and the 1986 rates were applied to the data for
the whole decade. The tariff rates and unit transportation  costs of each of the six apparel groups were
computed  as weighted  averages  of tariff rates and transportation  costs of the MFA categories  that
made  up each group.  Value-weights  were used for the tariff, and quantity weights we--  sed for the
unit transportation  costs. Thus, as the relative shares of each category in the group changed over the
years in the sample, so did the ad-valorem  tariff and the unit transportation  costs.
5. AdJusting  the Mexican  unit imnort price
The Mexican  unit import price from the MFA data set had to be adjusted  to Include  unit
transportation  costs and tariffs. In addition, it was necessary  to take into account the proportion  of
imports  that entered under the HTS 9802, and of these imports, the proportion  of value added in
Mexico  on which the tariff was levied. Information  on the value and quantity shares of imports  for
each MFA category from Mexico  entering  the U.S. under HTS 9802, and the share of 9802 value that
was added in Mexico,  was obtained  for the years 1987-1991  from the U.S. Department  of Commerce,
Office  of Textiles.
The adjustment  procedure using this information  was as follows:
Let V02  be the value of imports  under the MFA in each category i of group j that enter
under the HTS 9802 provisions,  and Vum be that part of Vu802  added in Mexico. Then the share of
Mexican  value added  for category i of group j is:
VAn
(A2)  so =  - i
U
The share of Mexican  value added in each group of apparel  j was calculated  as a weighted  average of
the component  category  shares for each year, using the HTS 9802 value shares as weights:
v,80 2 Z  Vu
(A3)  sj  . Sij  ..s2L  = 
Similarly,  let yU  be the quantity  share of imports  entering under HTS 9802, and (Pj,  be the value share
of imports  entering under HTS 9802.  The aggregate  HTS 9802 quantity and value shares in totalMexico  MFA  34
imports  at the group level were then calculated  as:
E Q8012
(A4)  y  =802  + Qn8D2
E  vs8 02
(A5)  Cpj  =  2
where Vu and Qi are the value and quantity  of imports  for each category i in group  j.  The FOB
value of HTS 9802 imports  (denoted  by superscript  802) and non-HTS  9802 imports  (denoted  by
superscript  n802) was calculated  using these shares, calculated  from the Department  of Commerce,
Office  of Textiles  data, and the aggregate  FOB value from the MFA data base, which we denote
vj02 +vP80'
.1  i  . . P jt  =  8012  + Qn 802
(A5)  Tjs0'2 =  Tj((pj/yj)  =  Vj8o2/Qj8o2
(A6)  Tn802  =  (P)/(1  )  =  Vjn8G2/QjN
In the above expression  we have omitted  the time subscript  for simplicity,  but since  the composition
of value shares changes  over time, the aggregate  shares also change. 21
The price of those imports  entering the U.S. under HTS 9802 was then calculated  as:
(A7)  pjt802 =  pjt802  (1 + sjtt)  + Tit
where tyt  is the ad-valorem  tariff rate and Tjt is the unit transportation  cost at the group level.  For
those goods not entering  under HTS 9802, the full tariff applies, so the price of imports  was
calculated:
(A8)  pjhn 302 =  Tjtn802  (1 + y.)  + Tjt.
The aggregate  price for each category  was then calculated  as a quantity  weighted  average  of the price
of imports entering  under HTS 9802 and those not entering under HTS 9802:
(A9)  pjtm =  yjtpjt802  +  (I  j )pjtr,802
2tNote, however, that  we only have  data for sj, <pj  and yj from 1987  to 1991. For previous  years we use the
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where the quantity  weights are the quantity  shares of imports  entering under IlT'S 9802 in (A4).
Using calculations  (A5) - (AB), It can be shown that the adjusted  price of Mexican  imports in the
U.S. market for each group  j in (A9) is equivalent  to:
(A9')  =  [pjm  jt  (Jt  jt  jt  j
which is the required expression  of total value of imports  divided  by the total quantity of imports.
6. Hjt, the numbers equivalent  of the Herfindahl  index  of concentration  in export permits among
Mexican  exporters.
The Herfindahl  index  of concentration  of quota  holdings among Mexican  exporters was
calculated  as:
(AlO)  Hjt  =
where n = the number  of firms holdinr quota export rights in category i, and S= = the share of
shipments  of category i in group  j by volurre.  Information  on the number  of firms in Mexico
holding  export permits was provided, for 1990  and 1991, by the Mexican Ministry  of Commerce
(SECOFI), Office  of Internz.ionai  Agreements. It was assumed  that for earlier years the 1990  firm
structure  prevailed. Sij was taken from the MFA database.Policy  R"aarch  Working Paper Series
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